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Assessment of the EPD&C/EPG FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTXVE 8UMM,_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
$or Preparation o_ FMEA and CIL. I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD&C/EPG)
hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items
To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without
reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documen-
tation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL
baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of
each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter EPD&C/EPG hardware.
The IOA product for the EPD&C/EPG analysis consisted of two hundred
sixty three failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in forty-two
potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to
the NASA baseline (as of 1 January 1988) which consisted of 211 FMEAS
and 47 CIL items. The comparison determined if there
were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the
NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all FMEAS.
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the Post 51-L baseline, with
the IOA recommended baseline, and any issues.
The differences between the NASA and IOA FMEA/CIL totals
are due to the process used to assign the failure modes. The
IOA analysis assigned failure modes at the component level
whereas, the NASA assigned failure modes to the circuit level.
After the comparison, it was determined there were no
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The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C/EPG consists of hardware that is required for the
command and control of electrical power generation, FC operation,
and cryogenic reactant distribution and control in the Orbiter.
The EPD&C/EPG consists of the following divisions:
ii The Power Section Assembly (PSA) utilizes the cryogenic
reactants to produce the necessary electrical power for
the Orbiter. By-products of this reaction include
excess water and heat. The PSA is composed of cell
plates, pressure plates, heater/insulator plates, and
cell voltage harnesses. Each stack contains ninety-six
cell plates grouped into three substacks connected in
series. Analog data outputs from each cell are
transmitted to the Orbiter via a cell performance
monitor.
• The Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) heats the
cryogenic reactants from the PRSDS to an acceptable
temperature for use in the PSA. The RCS delivers
reactants and controls the pressure within the cell
plates. Purging of the inert gases from the reactant
lines is provided along with the circulation of
hydrogen for excess water removal from the PSA. The
RCS is composed of preheaters, reactant regulator,
hydrogen pump-separator, condenser, and reactant
purge/vent lines.
• The Thermal Control System (TCS) controls operating
temperatures and electrolyte concentration in the PSA.
Waste heat is used to condense water vapor• Heat is
also transferred to the preheaters for the reactant
gases and rejected via the Orbiter vehicle cooling
system.
• The Water Removal Subsystem (WRS) removes product water
from the PSA during normal operation. The excess water
is produced from water vapor which is converted to a
liquid by the condenser. The WRS delivers the water to
the Orbiter vehicle potable water storage system or to
the water relief line. The WRS consists of the
condenser, hydrogen pump-separator, water trap, water
discharge line, and water purity sensor.
• The Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
(PRSDS) stores the cryogenic reactants (hydrogen and
oxygen) for use in the production of electrical power
in the fuel cells. The PRSDS can be configured to
include up to five tanks of each of the reactant gases.
5
Each tank contains redundant heating elements and
sensors to maintain the gases at the proper pressure.
The PRSDS also provides gases to the Environmental
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS).
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The elements of the EPD&C/EPG are installed in the mid-body of
the Orbiter vehicle beneath the payload bay liner. Each of the
three fuel cells are located in the forward part of the bay, with
FCP 1 on the left-hand side, with FCP 2 and FCP 3 located forward
and aft, respectively on the right-hand side. Each of the PRSDS
cryogenic reactant storage tanks are located along the outer
edges of the payload bay under the liner. Cryogenic reactants
(oxygen and hydrogen) are transferred on demand to the FCP and
oxygen is transported directly to the ECLSS. Crew command and
control is achieved via switches, circuit breakers, or meters
located in the Orbiter cabin. Product water from the PSA is
transported to the ECLSS for storage and waste heat is rejected
to the cooling system. Three-phase AC electrical power is
received from the Orbiter by the FCP to power the coolant pump,
hydrogen pump-separator, and the water purity sensor. DC power
generated by the FCP is distributed by the EPD&C. Reference
Figure 5.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the EPD&C/EPG hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 6 comprise







































































































Figure 6 - EPD&C/EPG INTERFACES
ii
4 • 0 _SESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/EPG hardware initially generated two
hundred sixty three failure mode worksheets and identified sixty
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. In order to facilitate the comparison, forty-two
additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These
analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L
baseline of 211 FMEAs and 47 CIL items, which was generated using the
NSTS 22206 FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of
the assessment, all of the 211 FMEAs were in agreement. The
difference in the total number of FME s between IOA and NASA is
due to the analysis level used to assign the failure modes.
A summary of the quanity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment i
+
I Component I NASA








A summary of the quanity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.




Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
NASA IOA Issues
47 47 0
Table III presents a summary of IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the EPD&C/FCP subsystem for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline.


















Table IV presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for













5 3/2R3 ) 3/33 TOTAL47 1
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed.
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding
IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains new IOA analysis worksheets that cover
failure modes that were not included in the original analysis.
These worksheets were added in order to make a comparison with
the NASA FMEAs on these failure modes.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
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2000 TO 2052, 2283X, 2285X TO
2288X
2053 TO 2117, 2280X
2118 TO 2131, 2207
2132 TO 2206, 2289X TO 2302X
2221 TO 2278, 2310X TO 2315X,
2352X TO 2353X
The five categories are discussed in the following sections along
with issues, and the recommendations for the Post 51-L FMEA/CIL.
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4.1 ]LHSBBSI4ENT RESULT8 - POWER SECTION ABSEMBLY (PSA)
The seven components included in this category are diodes, event
indicators (EI), hybrid driver controllers (HDC), meters,
resistors, signal conditioners (SC), and switches. A summary of the
quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the Power Section Assembly
versus the recommended baseline, and any issues identified is
presented in Table VI.
+
TABLE VI POWER SECTION ASSEMBLY (PSA)




































The comparison made between the NASA baseline and the IOA product
for the Power Section Assembly resulted in no isssues. The
thirteen additional IOA FMEAs are the results of the level of
analysis. In some cases, IOA's analysis were written at the
component level whereas the NASA FMEAs were written at the
circuit level. This difference in analysis level resulted
in the difference in the total FMEAs defined but due to the
criticalities assigned there were no issues.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CILs assessed for the Power
Section Assembly (PSA) versus the recommended IOA baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII POWER SECTION ASSEMBLY
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment


























Table VIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Power Section Assembly for the Post
51-L FMEAbaseline.
TABLE VIII POWER SECTION ASSEMBLY
































































Table IX presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Power Section Assembly (PSA) for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE IX POWER SECTION ASSEMBLY
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items































































4.2 _SESSMENT RESULTS - REACTANT CONTROL 8UBSYBTEM [RCS)
The seven components included in this category are circuit
breakers (CB), diodes, fuses, hybrid driver controllers (HDC),
remote power controllers (RPC), resistors, switches. A summary
of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the Reactant Control
Subsystem the recommended baseline, and any issues identified is
presented in Table X.
+
TABLE X REACTANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (RCS)





































The comparison made between the NASA baseline and the IOA product
for the Reactant Control Subsystem resulted inno isssues. The
twenty-seven additional IOA FMEAs are the results of the level of
analysis. In some cases, IOA's analysis were written at the
component level whereas the NASA FMEAs were written at the
circuit level. This difference in analysis level resulted
in the difference in the total FMEAs defined but due to the
criticalities assigned there were no issues.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CILs assessed for the Reactant
Control Subsystem (RCS) versus the recommended IOA baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table XI.
TABLE XI REACTANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment

















Table XII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Reactant Control Subsystem for the Post
51-LFMEA baseline.
TABLE XII REACTANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM


































































Table XIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XIII REACTANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
4















































4.3 ASSESSHENT RESULTS - THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (TCS)
The four components included in this category are diodes, fuses,
hybrid driver controllers (HDC), resistors. A summary of the
quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the Thermal Control
Subsystem versus the recommended baseline, and any issues
identified is presented in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (TCS)

























The comparison made between the NASA baseline and the IOA product
for the Thermal Control Subsystem resulted in no isssues. The
one additional IOA FMEAs are the results of the level of
analysis. In some cases, IOA's analysis were written at the
component level whereas the NASA FMEAs were written at the
circuit level. This difference in analysis level resulted
in the difference in the total FMEAs defined but due to the
criticalities assigned there were no issues.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CILs assessed for the Thermal
Control Subsystem (TCS) versus the recommended IOA baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table XV.
TABLE XV THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment












Table XVI presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Thermal Control Subsystem for the Post
51-L FMEAbaseline.
TABLE XVI THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM

















































Table XVII presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS) for the Post 51-L baseline.
+
TABLE XVII THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items

























4.4 ASSESBI_NT RESULTS - WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM (_)
The seven components included in this category are diodes, fuses,
hybrid driver controllers (HDC), reference junctions (RJ),
resistors, switches, temperature controllers (TC). A summary of
the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the Water Removal
Subsystem versus the recommended baseline, and any issues identified
is presented in Table XVIII.
TABLE XVIII WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM (WRS)




































The comparison made between the NASA baseline and the IOA product
for the Water Removal Subsystem resulted in no isssues. The
twenty-nine additional IOA FMEAs are the results of the level of
analysis. In some cases, IOA's analysis were written at the
component level whereas the NASA FMEAs were written at the
circuit level. This difference in analysis level resulted
in the difference in the total FMEAs defined but due to the
criticalities assigned there were no issues.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL assessed for the Water
Removal Subsystem (WRS) versus the recommended IOA baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table XIX.
TABLE XIX WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment

































Table XX presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Water Removal Subsystem for the Post
51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE XX WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM








































































Table XXI presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Water Removal Subsystem (WRS) for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XXI WATER REMOVAL SUBSYSTEM
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items

































































4 .S ]D_SSE88NENT RESULTS - POWER RF_CTANT8 8TOI_GE AND DISTRIBUTION
8YSTEM
The ten components included in this category are current level
detectors (CLD), diodes, hybrid driver controllers (HDC), remote
power controllers (RPC), resistors, switches, valves. A summary
of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the Power Reactants
Storage and Distribution System versus the recommended baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table XXII.
TABLE XXII POWER REACTANTS STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM





































The comparison made between the NASA baseline and the IOA product
for the Power Reactants Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS)
resulted in no issues. The twenty-three additional IOA FMEAS
are the results of the level of analysis. In some cases, IOA's
analysis were written at the component level whereas the
NASA FMEAs were witten at the circuit level. This difference in
analysis level resulted in the difference in the total FMEAs
defined but due to the criticalities assigned there were no issues.
A summary of the quantity of NASA CILs assessed for the Power
Reactants Storage and Distribution System versus the recommended
IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented in Table XXIII.
TABLE XXIII POWER REACTANTS STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM





































Table XXIV presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Power Reactants Storage and Distribution
for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE XXIV POWER REACTANTS STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM























































Table XXV presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the Power Reactants Storage and Distribution System for the Post
51-L baseline.
TABLE XXV POWER REACTANTS STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM































































Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used











JSC-12820, PCN-I, STS Operational Flight Rules,
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Orbiter Fuel Cell Powerplant Review and Training
Course, International Fuel Cells (IFC), 5-86
JSC-II174, Space Systems Handbook, Rev. C, DCN-5,
9-13-95
VS70-976102, Integrated System Schematic - Orbiter
Vehicle OV-102 EPDC, Rev. F, 7-2-86
VS70-945099, Integrated System Schematic - Orbiter
Vehicle OV-099, 103, & 104, Electrical Power Subsystem
(EPS), 7-18-85
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OV-102, Flt 7 and
subs
OV-099, Flt 1-3 only
OV-102, Flt 1-4 only
OV-102, Flt 6

















































- Abort Once Around
- Abort To Orbit
- Circuit Breaker
- Critical Items List
- Current Level Detector
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning
- Environmental Control and Life Support System
- Event Indicator
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generation
- Fuel Cell Powerplant
- Fuel Cell
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight System Software Requirement
- Get Away Special
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Not Applicable
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Forward
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Primary landing Site
- Power Section Assembly
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Rockwell International
- Reactant Control Subsystem
- Reference Junction
- Remote Power Controller
- Return To Landing Site
- Signal Conditioner
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control Subsystem
- Temperature Controller









Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For Preparation
Qf FMEA/CIL. i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE _CAUSE_ - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLy MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOM;NAL CREW pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT pHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. InstructiQns Sou
Preparation of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, was employed with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 ***-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
i. Component age life will not be considered in the
analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
• An 02 cry. tank will be assumed lost if both heaters in
one tank fail to function (i.e., neither heater will
function with the delta current sensors enabled).
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition. Flight
rule definition.
• An H2 cry. tank will be assumed lost if neither heater
in one tank will function.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definiton. Flight
rule definition.
• An impending loss of all cry. 02 or all cry. H2 tanks
will be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort
mode the loss/leak will allow.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
. Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail
when flying 3/4/5•
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during lift-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria.
• A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist.
a. Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
b. Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing.
Co Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS
H20 storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell
H20 relief system•
d. Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed•








f. Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
g. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle.
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel
cell to support. Voltage may go <25V
which will shut down the GPC's.
Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPD&C/EPG, it will be considered as a
failable redundant product-water relief line for
purposes of the EPG functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general
ground rule 2.3.2.d in NSTS 22206 but
is essential for evaluating failures
associated with the water relief line.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP
#I) is assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP
cannot be maintained operational at no-load, and will
be considered shutdown if the load cannot be maintained
at greater than 2 KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. RH FCP uses sustain
heater to maintain temps at no-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which
are normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed
failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until
the valve is required to be closed.
Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The configuration for all redundant
components is being considered for
this analysis.
Inadvertant Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL
abort is considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP 1/Main Bus A is loss of
OMS Engine Purge Capability (required
for TAL) and Aft Compartment MPS






This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :






NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2285 AND EPD&C-2286.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2287 AND EPD&C-2288.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA WILL NEED TO INCLUDE RESISTORS 32V73AIA2A2RI4, AND
32V73AIA2A2R3





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2079-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA NEEDS TO CORRECT NOTATION OF RESISTOR 32V73AIA2A2RI0. IOA
CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA NEEDS TO CORRECT NOTATION OF RESISTOR 32V73AIA2A2RI0.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA NEEDS TO CORRECT NOTATION OF RESISTOR 32V73AIA2A2R8. IOA
CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2078-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA NEEDS TO CORRECT NOTATION OF RESISTOR 32V73AIA2A2R8.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2040-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2 & 3 CONTROLLER





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2040-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2 & 3 CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2034-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL NO 1 START UP HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2034-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL NO 1 START UP HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2014
SWITCH, FC NO 2,3, STARTUP HEATER
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FC NO 2,3, STARTUP HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2093-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2093-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2094-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,TYPE I, AR9, AR8, AR8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, AR9, ARS, AR8
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2253-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P 3 [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURE TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
IOA





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2253-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE i, ARI0, ii, 9,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ J [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI0, ii, 9,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2152-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC READY FOR LOAD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2152-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC READY FOR LOAD




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2155-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC COOLANT PUMP DELTA P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2155-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC COOLANTPUMPDELTA P




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2151-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC GPC PURGE SEQ DSI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2151-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC GPC PURGE SEQ DSI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2043-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SELECTOR, FCP TEMP.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
]
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2043-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SELECTOR, FCP TEMP.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2158-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, FCP STACK OUTLET COOLANT TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2158-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, FCP STACK OUTLET COOLANT TEMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2303-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS DELETED THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION.


















SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2
J. PATTON
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2304-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS DELETED THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2301-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2301-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OA2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OA2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS DELETED THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2031-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL GPC PURGESEQ





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2054
SWITCH, FUEL CELL GPC PURGE SEQ
J. PATTON
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2077-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
FILM RESISTOR IS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA HAS DELETED THIS
FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2032-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
LOSS OF BOTH GPC AND MANUAL PURGE HEATER CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE WITH DEGREDATION OF FCP
PERFORMANCE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGEHEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE MDAC ID 2281 FOR "FAILS IN OFF POSITION" FAILURE MODE.











RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
FILM RESISTOR IS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2117-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2117-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2117-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











H DW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2119-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2119-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2177-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2068
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
J. PATTON
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2177-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2180-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2180-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2256-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K & I.SK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.SK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2021-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2083
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2084
CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #I THERMAL
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. SEE MDAC ID 2280 FOR
"SHORTS, FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2033-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2033-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SEE MDAC ID 2284 FOR "JAMMED IN OFF POSITION" FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2087-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
FILM RESISTOR IS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA HAS DELETED THIS
FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI, AR2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERTYPE III ARI, AR2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR3, AR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR3, AR4





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2095
CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #2 THERMAL
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE MDAC ID 2280 FOR "SHORTS, FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2087-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.




AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
NASA HAS DELETED THIS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,TYPE III, ARI, AR2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, _3, AR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #3 THERMAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




SEE MDAC ID 2280 FOR "SHORTS, FAILS CLOSED" FAILURE MODES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]











RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2088-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
FILM RESISTOR IS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA HAS DELETED THIS
FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,TYPE III, ARI, AR2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]







[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2113
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2009-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 2114
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP







NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2012-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSES, H2 AND 02 FLOWMETER PROTECTION
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HIERARCHY 4) ON IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET SHOULD DELETE FII AND F44
AND REPLACE WITH FUSES F7 AND F8.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2019-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSES, H2 AND 02 FLOWMETER PROTECTION
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




HIERARCHY 4) ON IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET SHOULD DELETE FUSES FII
AND F44 AND REPLACE WITH FUSES F7 AND F8.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODES, GSE AND VEHICLE ISOLATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODES, GSE AND VEHICLE ISOLATION







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2118
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2205-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARS, AR7,





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]












[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR8, AR7,
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE PIECE PART FAILURES TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, BLOCKING 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2254-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2209-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI3, ARI2,





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI3, ARI2,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2217-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,TYPE I, ARII, ARII




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARII, ARII




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2105-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2105-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR 1.2 KOHM, 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If. different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2132
SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 LINE HTR
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 2134
ITEM: FUSE, 1 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2135
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2136
ITEM: FUSE , 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2222-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERTYPE III, AR7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III, AR7





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] C ] [ ]
] C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2139
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPER III AR14
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FME #: 05-6MA-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPER III ARI4





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















ITEM: FUSE, i AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2143
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2144
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI4
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2146
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.














HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 2149
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET SHOULD DENOTE 40V76A27FS. ALTHOUGH THE
CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN DEMONSTRATED,
PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2222-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR24
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2222-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR24




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2030-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2152
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2153
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY 4) ON IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD DENOTE FUSE F3 AND
LOCATION SHOULD DENOTE 40V76A27F3.
ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER_TYPE III AR5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C_ ] C












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2156
ITEM: FUSE, 1 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2007-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2157
ITEM: FUSE, 1 AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2038-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 RELIEF HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
" CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
LOSS OF EITHER A OR B HEATERS RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO RID
FCP OF PRODUCT H20. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WHEN FUEL
CELLS FLOOD.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2038-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 RELIEF HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
FAILED ON HEATERS NOT CRITICAL.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 1 AMP BLOCKING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2270-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 1 AMP BLOCKING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2099-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 5.1 K OHM, 1/4 W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2163





HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

















DIODE, I AMP ISOLATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS SEPARATED THIS FMEA INTO TWO FMEAs. DIODES CR51 AND
CR53 ARE ON 2272 AND DIODES CR50 AND CR52 ARE ON 2273. IOA
CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2273-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA NOW INCLUDES DIODES CR50 AND CR52 ONLY.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2272-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, i AMP ISOLATION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2271-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY • REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I5 different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















DIODE, i AMP ISOLATION
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2121-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. AN INTERNAL SHORT OF A
FILM RESISTOR IS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE. NASA HAS DELETED THIS
FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2170
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2173
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY
REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR44




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY
REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR44




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































(If different from NASA)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR39




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR39




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2179
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR40




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION. THIS IS A STANDBY
REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR40




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 2182
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY 3) ON IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET SHOULD DENOTE
PCA-3. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2222-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR25




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HEATERS REQUIRED DURING STARTUP OF FPC. ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY
TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES
EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2222-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR25




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2185
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION. THIS A STANDBY REDUNDANT
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




HEATERS REQUIRED DURING STARTUP OF FCP. ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY
TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES
EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
THIS IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2028-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDACID: 2188
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2189
HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION OF THE PRIMARH HDC'S FOR THE
H20 RELIEF LINE HEATERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2230-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2230-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION OF THE SECONDARY HDC'S FOR
THE H20 RELIEF LINE HEATERS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2230-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2193
ITEM: FUSE, 1 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2229-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR37




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2229-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR37




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2601-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2196
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [_ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EPD&C-2197
05-6MA-2228-I
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
EPD&C
2197




[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2228-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5, AR36
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, DUE TO TESTS RESULTS FROM
ROCKWELL.














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALTHOUGH THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT HAS NEVER BEEN
DEMONSTRATED, PROCEDURES EXIST TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2044-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2045-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2201
ITEM: _ THERMAL SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2045-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES TO UPGRADE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2046-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2046-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES TO UPGRADE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS DELETED THIS FAILURE MODE. SEE MDAC ID 2289 THRU 2294.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.






NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER AR49, AR49
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS DELETED THIS FAILURE MODE. SEE MDAC ID 2289 THRU 2294.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2207
FCP 1,2,3 HTR PWR ON IND. 5.1K RESISTOR
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL "
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HIERARCHY 3) ON IOA ANALYSIS SHEETS SHOULD READ TERM BD.
40TB134,135,136. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2026-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3 REACTANTS





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2026-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL I, 2, 3 REACTANTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2311.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK i_4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS COMBINED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY HEATER CONTROL INTO ONE
FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ _ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2312 AND EPD&C-2226.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2027-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FAILURE MODE WITH MDAC ID 2312 AND MDAC ID
2313. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2227




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVAULATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2314 AND EPD&C-2315.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2029-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS COMBINED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY HEATER CONTROL INTO ONE
FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCE ASSESSMENT ID EPD&C-2316 AND EPD&C-2232.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FAILURE MODE WITH MDAC ID 2229. IOA
CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.














SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FAILURE MODE WITH MDAC ID 2316 AND MDAC ID
2317. IOA CONCURS WITH NASAtS REEVALUATION.











NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2233
RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2 WATT
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HIERARCHY 4) ON ANALYSIS WORKSHEET SHOULD READ RESISTORS AIR1,
R5, RII, RI4, A2R2, RI0. FAILURE IS READILY DETECTABLE.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2 WATT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA NEEDS TO GENERATE A FMEA TO COVER THE "PARAMETER DEVIATION,
LO-RESIST" FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER IOA





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER IOA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER 5A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER 5A




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'A REEVALUATION. THIS ITEM SHOULD BE A CIL
ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF POWER TO "OPEN" POSITION OF FCP REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE.
LOSS OF REACTANTS TO FCP AND FCP SHUTDOWN. IOA CONCURS WITH
NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, OPEN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL FAILURE CAUSES INADVERTENT OPEN OF REACTANT VALVE,
CAUSING REACTANT CROSSOVER IN FCP AND POSSIBLE EXPLOSION.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, CLOSE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. POSSIBLE REACTANT CROSSOVER IN FAILING
FCP, CREATING AN POSSIBLE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION. IOA CONCURS WITH
NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]









NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
















[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,02 HTR A&B CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL SERIES HDC SHORT, FAILURE OF MANIFOLD VALVE AND TANK
RELIEF VALVE CLOSED RESULT IN CONTINUOUS ENERGIZING OF 02 HEATER
CONTROL, POSSIBLE DAMAGE OF TANK AND LOSS OF MISSION.
OVERHEATING OF TANK COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
IOA CONRUS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2250
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2301-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LEVEL DETECTOR, 02 TANK HTR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CURRENT LEVEL DETECTOR, 02 TANK HTR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
ix]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2045-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD i ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2044-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]











NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2255
H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2046-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROLCIRCUIT









NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2257




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURE TO UPGRADE CRITICALITY. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2049-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 PRIMARYECLSS VALVE #i SUPPLY SYS.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2050-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 PRIMARY ECLSS VALVE #i SUPPLY SYS.




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2261




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUTION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUTION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-2263B
05-6MB-2031-I
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2263




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2031-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VLV CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VLV CONTROL CIRCUIT









[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VLV CONTROL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FCP 1 REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT









[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FCP i REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2269
FCP 2 REACTANT VLV CNTL CKT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FCP 2 REACTANT VLV CNTL CKT






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA INCLUDES WHAT PARTS?
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-2271
05-6MB-2043-I
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2271
















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2043-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FCP 3 REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA INCLUDES WHAT PARTS?
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2049-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 SECONDARY ECLSS VLV NO. 2 SUPPLY SYS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2052-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 SECONDARY ECLSS VLV NO. 2 SUPPLY SYS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2066-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIRCUITS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2080-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H2 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIRCUITS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




"B" SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" DUE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-2277
NONE
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2277




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIRCUITS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




"B" SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" DUE TO STANDBY REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2280
CIRCUIT BREAKERS, FC #i, #2, #3 THERMAL
J. PATTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE&a1224_ [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC ID 2084, 2095, AND 2104 FOR "OPEN" FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2032-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA's REEVALUATION. SEE MDAC ID 2057 AD 2058
FOR ADDITIONAL FAILURE MODES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2122-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FCP 1,2,3, HTR PWRON IND 5.1K RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE MDAC ID 2207 FOR "OPEN, HI-RESIST" FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2151-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVENT INDICATOR, FC GPC PURGE SEQ DSI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2033-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2039-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2039-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON
ASSESSMENT:
CIL CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2039-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
IX]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2307-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE A CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. A FAILED LOW REFERENCE
JUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN INCORRECT SIGNAL TO THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONER. HEATERS WILL FAIL ON. HOWEVER TESTS AT ROCKWELL
SHOWED THIS TO BE A 3/3 FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2307-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE A CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2308-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE B CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, DUE TO TEST RESULTS FROM
ROCKWELL.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2308-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE B CONTROLLER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2309-I
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 2293
ITEM: FUSE, i0 AMP







NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE) •




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, DUE TO TEST RESULTS FROM
ROCKWELL.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2311-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2311-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ O ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2311-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(AD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2311-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, DUE TO TEST RESULTS FROM
ROCKWELL.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MA-2311-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, DUE TO TEST RESULTS FROM
ROCKWELL.












NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2302
TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3 REACTANTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2026-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, FUEL CELL I, 2, 3 REACTANTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C _] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[ X ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2027-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 _HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO "RESET" HEATERS. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION. THIS ITEM SHOULD BE ON THE CIL.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION. THIS ITEM SHOULD BE ON THE
CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2029-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "RESET" CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2253-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "RESET" CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2254-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATERCIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)











[ 3/IR] [ F ]
[ / ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
EPD&C-2356X
05-6MB-2255-I
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2356




[ P ] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2255-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2256-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2257-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "TEST" CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "TEST" CIRCUIT









[ 3 /2R ] [ F ]
[ / ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2363
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-201400-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







H2 INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUIT, H2 TEMPERATURE AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2365




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]











] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6MB-201600-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 CURRENT LEVEL DETECTION CIRCUIT









NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
EPD&C-2367X
05-6MB-201600-I
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
2367
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3
START/STOP CONTROL
SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3
CONTROLLER
RESISTORS, 1.2K
HDC, TYPE i, ARI0, ii,
9, i0
CIRCUIT BREAKERS,
FC 1,2, 3 THERMAL
SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE
HEATER
HDC TYPE III ARI, AR2
HDC TYPE III AR3, AR4
FUSE , 3 AMP
HDC TYPE III AR8, AR7
DIODE, BLOCKING 3 AMP










FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAIL







FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAIL












OPEN, ELEMENT OPENS, HI
RESIST
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS
CONDUCT











































INTERNAL SHORT, FAIL TO
CLOSE





H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORT TO GND
H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORT TO GND
H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORT TO GND






H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORT TO GND
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORT TO GND




INTERNAL SHORT, FAILS T
CLOSE
HDC, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3
CLOSE CONTROL
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS T
CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPENS














































02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORTS TO GND
02 MAIFOLD 1 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
POWER, SHORTS TO GND






H2 MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION
VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF












SWITCH, FUEL CELL I, 2, 3
REACTANTS
SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3
REACTANTS
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL
CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY
CLOSES
SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3
REACTANTS
SHORTS IN "OPEN" POSIT]
INADVERTENTLY CLOSES I_
"OPEN" POSITION




CLOSE IN "CLOSE" POSIT'
SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4
HEATER CONTROL
SHORTS IN "ON" POSITION
INADVERTENTLY CLOSES IN
"ON" POSITION
SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4
HEATER CONTROL
SHORTS IN "AUTO" POSITI
INADVERTENTLY CLOSES IN
"AUTO" POSITION

























SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4
PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4
STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4
TEST/RESET CONTROL






FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL
TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO
CLOSE







This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEA's. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206 Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
add CIL. i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and theworst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2280 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:





LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPG
2 ) FUEL CELL
3 ) PNL L4







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
31V73A4CB65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT PROTECTION TO FUEL CELL PUMP FROM BUS.




ALSO CIRCUIT BREAKERS CB68, CB69, CB70, CB71, CB72,
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE HEATER
FAILS IN OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO HEAT LINES OF FCP PURGE. PLUGGING OF LINES
DUE TO FREEZING WILL CAUSE FLOODING OF FCP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF FCP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2282 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FCP 1,2,3, HTR PWR ON IND 5.1K RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,
SHORT













TERM BD 40TB134, 135, 136
RESISTOR, MODULE ASSY 5.1K OHMS
CRITICALITIES



















CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MEASURE STATUS OF FCP END CELL HTR.
EFFECT. ALTERNATE MEASUREMENT METHODS AVAILABLE.
NO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:






EVENT INDICATOR, FC GPC PURGE SEQ DSI
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO DO AUTO PURGE.
TO FCP PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:






SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES
JAMMED IN OFF POSITION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIS3, 32V73AI2AIS4, 32V73AI2AIS5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PURGE FCP.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
DEGRADATION OF FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE AND
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_ WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2285 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER IN "START" POSITION, FAILS TO
CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYSLEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2 ) FUEL CELL
3 ) PNL RIA2





























CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO START A FUEL CELL OR RESTART A FCP ON-ORBIT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER ADDITIONAL FCP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM'. ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2286 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER IN "STOP" POSITION, FAILS TO
CLOSE














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2SI6, 32V73AIA2SI7, 32V73AIA2SI8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7355
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO SHUTDOWN A FUEL CELL. MULTIPLE FCP FAILURES
COULD RESULT IN REACTANT CROSSOVER IN AFFECTED FCP AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-8
_-
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/i1/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:






SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
INADVERTENT OPERATION IN "START" POSITION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
I2tNDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOP A FCP. MULTIPLE FAILURES CAN LEAD TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER A REACTANT CROSSOVER OCCURS
IN AFFECTED FCP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
INADVERTENT OPERATION IN "STOP" POSITION, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EPG
2 ) FUEL CELL
3 ) PNL RIA2







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2SI6, 32V73AIA2SI7, 32V73AIA2SI8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7355
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL CELL WOULD STOP PREMATURELY. LOSS OF ABILITY TO
START/RESTART AFFECTED FCP. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE A CONTROLLER
FAILS LOW























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC476-0133-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:






REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE A CONTROLLER
FAILS HIGH























B [NA ] c[p]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC476-0133-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE B CONTROLLER
FAILS LOW



























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:




ITEM: REFERENCE JUNCTION, H20 NOZZLE B CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH



























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2293 ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE, i0 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPG









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-I000
B [NA ] C [ P ]






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
E OUTPUT FAIL OFF/ON
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
H OUTPUT FAILS OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
H OUTPUT FAILS ON












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
E OUTPUT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPG









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:












TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
E OUTPUT FAILS ON























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[o]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




2/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT : 3/IR




TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
N OUTPUT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
N OUTPUT FAILS ON























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
H OUTPUT FAILS OFF



























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT
H OUTPUT FAILS ON























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME450-0062-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3 REACTANTS

































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, FUEL CELL I, 2, 3 REACTANTS

































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL
































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL

































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL






























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL












































SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 HEATERCONTROL


































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 HEATER CONTROL

































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT













MID PCA I, 2 & 3
DIODES (REF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: _ TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /







REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)













MID PCA I, 2 & 3
DIODES (REF) •
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: (REF)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246








REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2352 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "RESET" CIRCUIT
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
































REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "RESET" CIRCUIT
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPG
2 ) PRS DS
3)





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; H2 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)






























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (GSE/MDM)
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "TEST" CIRCUIT
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 "TEST" CIRCUIT
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)
OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIODE, ISOLATION; 02 HEATER CIRCUIT (SWITCH)
SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EPG
2 ) PRS DS
3)

























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: /
MDAC ID: 2364 ABORT: /
ITEM: H2 INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUIT, H2 TEMPERATURE AND
PRESSURE READOUT
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: /
MDAC ID: 2365 ABORT: /
ITEM: 02 INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUIT; 02 TEMPERATURE AND
PRESSURE READOUT
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












02 CURRENT LEVEL DETECTION CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












02 CURRENT LEVEL DETECTION CIRCUIT
INTERNAL SHORT





























REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-50
APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment





2 IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the subject
failure mode.
3 IOA concurs with NASA's reevaluation.
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16055 SPACE CENTER BLVD, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77062
